University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL
Theses

Graduate Works

11-16-2011

The Specialization of Foreign Assistance in SubSaharan Africa
Kevin Michael Richardson
University of Missouri-St. Louis, kmrwy6@mail.umsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis
Recommended Citation
Richardson, Kevin Michael, "The Specialization of Foreign Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa" (2011). Theses. 286.
http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/286

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an
authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

The Specialization of Foreign Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa
Kevin M. Richardson
M.A., Political Science, University of Missouri – St. Louis, 2011
B.S., Political Science, Truman State University, 2009
A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri – St. Louis in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts in Political Science with an emphasis in Public Policy
November 2011
Advisory Committee
David Kimball, Ph.D.
Chairperson
Kenneth Thomas, Ph.D.
Martin Rochester, Ph.D.
Ruth Iyob, Ph.D
Copyright, Kevin M. Richardson, 2011

Abstract
This study uses time-series cross-sectional logistic and OLS regressions to analyze data
on foreign assistance and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa to determine the impact of
different methods of foreign aid on democracy and democratic characteristics in SubSaharan Africa. Even though all foreign assistance has the end goal of promoting
democratic growth, different aid targeted sectors have varying effects on democracy. The
research has found that aid targeting social infrastructure, specifically health and
government sectors, in Sub-Saharan Africa has a substantial, positive effect on
democracy and democratic characteristics while economic infrastructure aid has no
effect. This analysis could have an impact on future aid allocation by promoting aid
specialization for social infrastructure.
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Introduction

Economic aid has played a critical role in Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of
colonialism. During the Cold War economic aid was tied to political and geographic
factors. For Western nations aid was given to those countries which opposed
communism and were strategically located near a communist state, many times at the
expense of the citizens. Instead of foreign assistance being used for improving societal
conditions it was typically used to increase the ruling party’s power through the military
and personal wealth. During the Cold War instilling capitalistic and democratic ideals
within the recipient nations was almost of no concern, as Western nations openly
supported harsh dictators exemplified by the U.S.'s lengthy support of Mobutu in Zaire.
Economic aid to Africa changed greatly after the Cold War though as the spread of
communism was no longer a threat, forcing Western states to reconsider foreign aid
policy. Since the Cold War aid has now become tied to democratic and liberal
advancements within recipient states. Western countries, especially the United States,
France, and Great Britain, have invested large amounts in Sub-Saharan Africa with little
hope that any of that will ever be paid back. These nations though do have other
advantages though such as the rich natural resources of some African nations and the
hope that economic development will create a more favorable environment for
international business. These nations along with the World Bank and IMF have tied aid
to difficult to measure goals so they can have some measure of how successful their
investment is. The research question arises then how successful is economic aid in
fostering democratic changes within Sub-Saharan Africa.
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The ability of economic aid to foster political changes is greatly contested. Some
believe that the aid does help by providing states the resources to enhance infrastructure,
education, and other necessary improvements. Others though find that the economic aid
ends up falling into the hands of corrupt leaders who use it for personal gains or cause
strife over who is in charge of dispersing the funds. Most research was initially
concerned with how the aid effected economic conditions within the recipient nations but
more recently the push has been to understand the effects on governance. Understanding
the effect on governance provides a more useful indicator for the success of foreign aid
by measuring the more significant and long term effect it can have on recipient states.

One of the biggest arguments about foreign aid concerns what methods of aid
disbursement result in the greatest benefit to recipients. The debate centers on a similar
debate over the characteristics that work most effectively to instill democratic
governance. Some contend that assistance benefiting business and market institutions
provides the greatest catalyst for democracy while others counter that assistance for
social programs such as education or health achieve this best. Currently foreign
assistance tends to be granted in large quantities for multiple functions with the goal of
development and easing the burdens of poverty. The conversation then revolves around
whether wide ranging or specialized aid results in the greatest recipient benefit. Then if
specialization is the best method the focus shifts back to the debate over economic or
social program assistance.

The purpose of the specialization is to pinpoint the conditions that allow for an
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increase in government expenditures for integral functions such as basic education,
sanitation, infrastructure, and health services. The development of these functions should
lead to a basic quality of life improvement through higher life expectancy, higher literacy
rate, and eventually a more educated public. Over time the advancements allow for an
increase in information exchange, political participation, and other essential components
of democratic states. In determining which method of specialization best benefits
democratization, donors can optimize their assistance so that they are reaching the
greatest number of beneficiaries in the most desirable sectors.

The analysis of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa must account for a multitude of
factors identified through previous research. This paper seeks to further the research by
addressing the important arguments and mistakes of previous studies. First, the analysis
will account for time since to truly analyze foreign aid it needs to be determined how it
affects governance over a significant time frame. Yearly changes in both foreign aid and
governance typically are small but compounded over time the results hopefully are
substantial. Next aid will be distinguished between social and economic infrastructure to
determine whether assistance for one sector has a greater influence on democracy in SubSaharan Africa. Identifying the differences between these forms of assistance will assist
donors in adjusting their funds to the most beneficial sectors. Finally social infrastructure
assistance will be broken into its components to understand whether aiding certain facets
of society are building democratic governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Democracy
Democracy has long been considered the most ideal government system for many reasons
5

such as promoting the most free and open society and best supporting economic growth
and stability. In being the most touted government structure, democracy is promoted
around the world as the system to strive for in order to produce the best state. As a
developing region, Sub-Saharan Africa has been at the forefront of the conversation on
instilling democratic regimes. The Sub-Saharan states, not without trying, have struggled
to introduce and maintain democracy since the end of colonialism except for a few
nations such as Botswana. In order to fully analyze democratization in Sub-Saharan
Africa, an understanding is needed of the basic conditions considered ideal for supporting
a democratic society.
First according to Schmitter and Karl (1991), “modern political democracy is a
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public
realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their
elected representatives.”1 This is the most basic definition of democracy but many also
include aspects such as civil liberties, fair and free elections, and freedom of speech.
Democratization constitutes one of the most important aspects of international relations
for several reasons. Democracy is considered the most stable form of government and
most conducive to capitalism. Another major consequence of democracy is the
democratic peace theory, which holds that no democratic regimes have entered war
against one another and thus never will.
Certain characteristics of democracies are integral to their ability to maintain a
stable government system and promote freedom and growth. One aspect is a high degree
of transparency which allows “interested citizens to observe policy choices, grand
strategies, and major regime discontinuities in a timely way, as well as to see the sources
1Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), 75.
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and intensity of support and opposition to specific commitments.”2 In modern
democracies transparency is a necessary part of the system due to the right of the public
to know the government's policies and intentions and the freedom of the press.
Politicians within democracies openly voice their policies to the public leaving
themselves open to the scrutiny of other politicians, the public and the media. The
openness of democracies is important because it gives the public the ability to make
informed decisions and allows the market and businesses to adequately adjust to changes
in policy.
Another important facet of democracies is stable succession of leadership and
continuity of governance. In democratic regimes the selection of senior officials is based
on clear rules ensuring orderly succession permitting policies to develop within a sound
domestic framework.3 Orderly changes in leadership limit instability and violence within
a state because there is no question of legitimacy; leadership with questionable legitimacy
is often met with strong public protest and sometimes force. Political stability is also
supported by a strong continuity of governance. In enduring democracies a change of
leadership does not result in complete overhaul of policies, services, and society. Instead
policy changes are fairly small with many longstanding policies typically weathering any
regime change, even one that appears to be dramatically different from previous
leadership. The public knows that services provided in one regime will still be provided
in the next and this knowledge of government continuance lowers legitimacy questions
and promotes societal peace.
The next attribute of a democracy, public voice and government accountability, is
2Charles Lipson. Reliable partners: how democracies have made a separate peace. (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2003) p. 14.
3
Ibid. p. 8.

7

probably the most important insurance for a free and open society. The public voice
manifests itself in multiple forms: citizens freely expressing opinions through forums,
protests, the media, and countless other methods; citizens electing representatives; and
petitioning and voting for law changes. The freedom of the people also promotes
accountability as there are visible electoral incentives for leaders to keep their promises
and consequences, what Lipson calls audience costs, for breaking promises to the
electorate.4 Democratic leaders are constrained by the public because to get elected they
must appeal to large constituencies preventing singular radical ideals from penetrating the
government. Once in power leaders must retain the public's confidence and will be
punished for ineffective policies and abandoning election promises. Voice and
accountability along with the other key aspects of democracies are all necessary because
without one the others cannot exist.
The key characteristics of democracies make it so appealing to citizens, business,
and the international community as a whole. As noted earlier democracies tend to best
promote strong, annual economic growth. This occurs through the establishment of
conditions that support innovation, entrepreneurship, and again stability. Citizens value
democracy because it provides the best option for voicing their opinions, reducing
violence, and offering social services that improve the quality of life. Finally the
international community supports democracy across the globe because of the economic
and social benefits of the state but also because democratic governments interact
peacefully with one another.5
If democracy with all of its argued benefits really is the end goal for states, which

4
5

Lipson. p. 9.
Ibid. p. 1.
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this paper assumes it is, then it is important to understand the conditions for democratic
governance. The conditions can loosely be divided between social and economic which
sets up the majority of the debate over what constitutes the ideal setting for democracy.
This section focuses on the ideal conditions for democracy with some consideration given
to the argument over the best situation for fostering democracy. One common theme
among democracy scholars is that a large, strong middle class is important for developing
and maintaining democracy because it reduces “the proportion of the population that is
susceptible to anti-democratic parties and ideologies and by increasing the proportion of
the population that supports moderate pro-democratic parties.”6 The middle class is a
moderately wealthy and educated group within a society which positions them perfectly
to support democratic ideals. The debate then is over whether economic developments or
social developments provide the best mechanisms for promoting a middle class.
Proponents of economic conditions make the case that promoting a strong market
economy has the greatest effect on democratization. The argument is “capitalist
economic development...produces a shift in the labor force from agriculture to industry
and services [and] this shift increases the size of the urban middle class and the size of
the urban working class which fosters the inauguration of democracy.”7 The emergence
of a strong middle and working class leads to a demand for more social and political
freedoms as well as welfare services. Muller also brings up urbanization which is
another condition for democratic changes as citizens living in urban areas have more
interest in political institutions and have the greatest access to communication.
The problem with arguing for the economic conditions is that it misses the inherent

6
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Muller, E. (1995). Economic Determinants of Democracy. American Sociological Review, 60(6), 967.
Ibid. 969.
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social causes of economic development. Before a strong middle class can even emerge
there must be in place some education system for people to move into the higher skilled
professions. At the most basic level is the need for a literate public which, Lipset
contends, is one of the first prerequisites for democracy.8 Literacy is the most basic
societal characteristic that is necessary for any government based on citizen participation
because a citizen needs to at least be able to read ballots. Also a literate citizen typically
has some minimal informal education or at least the ability to comprehend basic
governmental policies and functions. For these reasons, a literate electorate is necessary
for the beginnings of democratization. Literacy also serves as a good measure of the
social condition within a state as the higher the literacy rate the more likely the higher the
development.
A high literacy rate may serve as an entrance fee for adopting democratic
governance but the development of a more educated populace improves the stability and
progression of society. Lipset puts the need for education best, that it “presumably
broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance,
restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their
capacity to make rational electoral choices.”9 Studying the influence of education though
is tricky as different levels equate to varying levels of social, economic, and political
development. Public primary education serves as one of the best methods for promoting
democracy within a society for a few reasons. First, a population with high rates of
primary education completion positively and directly relates to higher literacy rates
making it one of the best methods for guaranteeing a literate public. Also primary
8
9

Lipset, S. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105.
Ibid. 79.
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education provides the perfect opportunity for civic education which furthers the ability
of the public to more fully make informed political decisions.
As the population of a state moves to higher education levels the thought is that the
country becomes more developed, economically, politically, and socially. Edward
Glaeser et. al. (2004) argues that not only do differences in schooling explain differences
in democracy but even more generally in political institutions.10 Political institutions rely
on highly educated individuals to operate effectively so it makes complete sense then that
as these institutions are able to develop so too does democracy within the state. Initial
institutions in developing democracies must start off small because there is not the human
capital present to manage a large political infrastructure, but as the population becomes
more educated the institutions can evolve to fit the growing capabilities of the public. So
while primary education may be a perfect entrance into democracy higher levels of
education allow democracy to advance as well as the economic and social conditions of
the state.
Some studies suggest that education does not play an important role in fostering
democracy and that it is the unknown fixed effects that are impacting both education and
democracy. The argument centers around the fact the relationship between democracy
and education has used cross-sectional regression and this type of regression does not
included fixed effects and within country variation. Proponents of this argument suggest
“the relationship between education and democracy is driven by omitted factors
influencing both education and democracy rather than a causal relationship.”11 The
argument suggests that using a fixed effects model is the best method of regression to
10
11

Glaeser, E., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Do Institutions Cause
Growth? . Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), 271-303.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., & Yared, P. (2005). From Education to Democracy?. The
American Economic Review, 95(2), 48.
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ensure a robust model that takes into account the omitted within country variables. The
omitted within country variables cover various socioeconomic characteristics such as
religion, language, social class, and ethnicity.
After education, the next important social condition is an overall healthy
population. The pursuit of health constitutes the most basic human need, a necessity for
survival which trumps all other needs and desires. In the least developed states much of
the population suffers from malnutrition, deadly infectious diseases, and lack of basic
medicines among numerous other health deficits. A population that struggles to meet
their most basic needs can never achieve significant development or democracy because
before individuals can pursue existential needs, such as rights and freedoms, they must
first not worry about survival.12 While education may contribute more to fostering
development and democratic ideas, an individual must attain a lifestyle no longer fully
encompassed by basic survival before even contemplating educational attainment. Once
health is no longer a concern of the general population, the public can begin to demand
greater freedoms, rights, and accountability from the government.
The final societal aspect to be explored here is the access to modern sanitation and
water systems, which are essential to ensuring a healthy population. A sanitation system
is one of the best methods for lowering the spread of diseases by removing free standing
waste that produces and harbors bacteria. Basic running water is also important because
in underdeveloped states the procurement of clean drinking water can be arduous and
time consuming. In a society where accessing clean water can be the longest daily task,
individuals will never have the capacity to pursue great opportunities.

12

Kosack, S., & Tobin, J. (2006). Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, FDI and
Government in Economic Success. International Organization, 60(1), 205-243.
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In international relations, democracy has long been considered the desired end goal
for all states due to the vast array of benefits produced through it. Domestically
democracy provides the greatest level of individual freedoms and political participation
while at the same time fostering a conducive environment for economic growth and
stability. The domestic positives also play a role on the international and regional level
by lowering barriers to outside investment and trade and lowering the risk of interstate
disputes. The field of international relations is so concerned with democracy because of
its considerable positives domestically which in turn lead to a more peaceful global
political arena, a democratic peace. Democratization has been occurring throughout the
world in stages as regions develop the capacity to build a democratic system.
World democratization has been divided into waves. Currently we are in the third
or fourth wave depending on who is writing, and each has affected different regions of
the world. The current wave followed the fall of the Soviet Union and resulted in 28
countries abandoning communism but some formed democracies while others
dictatorships.13 One of the major issues concerning the current world situation is not only
the transition to democracy but the difficulty of maintaining a stable democracy. Many
nations have been able to institute some democratic reforms, such as elections, but in
Latin America and especially Sub-Saharan Africa they have either not lasted or continue
the same authoritarian regime thinly veiled as a democracy.
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa
Attempts at democratization have been an integral part of Sub-Saharan Africa postcolonization but the region contains almost no stable, lasting democracies. Scholars have
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McFaul, M. (2003). The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in
the Postcommunist World. World Politics,54(2), 212-244.
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pointed to multiple factors, both social and economic, contributing to Sub-Saharan
Africa’s lack of democratic progress. One is the limited size of the public with a stake in
democracy due to widespread poverty, small middle class, and a disproportionally young
and rural population.14 Another common factor is the high ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and common division of society into numerically and/or politically
dominant versus minor social groups.15 Some examples of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and societal divisions are Rwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which consists of over 100 different ethnic groups. Sub-Saharan
Africa has one of the most difficult societies for instituting and promoting democracy.
What makes democratization in the region even more difficult is that the region does not
fit any conventional development theories.
One major problem within Sub-Saharan African states is low education completion
and even participation at all levels. In order for a society to democratize there needs to be
a literate public with some education but also a highly educated group to operate the
administration. During colonialism Africans made up only around 10-15% of public
officials but following independence that number increased to almost completely for
Africanized public administrations within a few years.16 This can clearly be seen as a
positive since the public administration now consists of individuals vested in the interests
of the state and devoted to its growth. The problem though is the administrations
following independence are comprised of only 10-15% with previous experience and
14 Mattes, R., & Bratton, M. (2007). Learning about democracy in Africa: awareness, performance, and
15

16

experience. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 192-217.
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1203-1250.
Mutahaba, Gelase. "Ecology and Public Administration in Africa: A Review of Their Relationships
Since Independence." In The Ecology of public administration & management in Africa . New Delhi:
Vikas Pub. House, 1986. 1-17.
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about the same percent with a university education. These early administrations lacked
the necessary intellectual resources to operate effectively and provide the important
activities for development. The administrations have developed some since the end of
colonialism but the administrations are still severely limited by patrimonialism. The
administrations were and some still today based on patrimonialism, the selecting of
individuals who pay allegiance to the political leaders and represent the leaders' ethnic
and tribal background.17 Patrimonialism constitutes one of the most severe forms of
corruption that kept the administrations loyal to the leadership and not the people.
Proponents of economic development for promoting democracy stress a strong free
market where private industry can grow and create jobs. The problem though is western
economies function well with unintruisive administrative action but a developing state
cannot sustain itself or function freely without state intervention. There are several
reasons why the African state requires a high degree of intervention in the economy. One
major issue is limited market competition. The major state production was agriculture
which did not contribute much to the state's prosperity as most was for
individual/community consumption, providing no taxable source. Also many of the
profit rich sectors of the state, namely the mining sector, are controlled by foreign entities
which export almost all the goods and send the majority of the profits abroad.
Another developing region, Asia and especially China, was able to utilize its large
entrepreneurial class and Latin American benefited from Catholic church activities to
perform a variety of developmental functions. The ability to tap into voluntary and
nongovernmental organizations limited the financial and organizational burdens on the
17 Alence, Rod. "Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa." The
Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 2 (2004). p. 165.

15

state. Africa though was not able to utilize such an important sector of the state. For one
African states lacked a substantial entrepreneurial class and there is little indigenous
church-supported activities along with a distrust for the private sector and preference for
state interventions.18
The next major economic issue is that there is little industrial production in SubSaharan Africa. When western states went through the most rapid stages of growth the
administration was graced with the substantial industrial productivity. Western states had
unparalleled industrial growth that enabled the state to begin to play a larger role in
society, through regulation and social programs, due to the substantial increase in
revenue. The issue with decolonial African states is there is almost no industrial
production, the vast majority of the economy is comprised of agriculture, meaning there
is a shortage of employment and state revenue.
The last major issue is that the majority of the African states' GDPs come from
foreign aid. African states are not self-sustainable and must rely on this outside
assistance to produce even basic services, which in many countries are still lacking.
During the early 1980s it was discovered that the Sub-Saharan states that were already
receiving copious amounts of aid would be faced with an even dire situation down the
road as projections found that over 90% of all capital goods required for development
would have to be imported, as well as the majority of food.19 The problem with this is
that aid should be used less for running the state and more for creating state sponsored
growth projects such as improving infrastructure and building societal establishments
18 Umeh, Ogwo J., and Gregory Andranovich. Culture, development, and public administration in
Africa . Bloomfield, Ct: Kumarian Press, 2005. 91.

19 Adedeji, Adebayo. "Administrative Adjustments and Responses to Changes in the Economic
Environment." In The Ecology of public administration & management in Africa . New Delhi: Vikas
Pub. House, 1986. 106.
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such as hospitals and schools. The issue though was these states had considerable strides
to make such as a 300% increase in meat production, an average annual growth rate of
9.3% in energy production, and a more than triple increase in cereals production.20
ODA and Economic Growth
Studies regarding economic growth have focused on the effect aid has on the
recipient state’s GDP. In most cases aid has had a positive effect on GDP but only under
certain conditions. Official Development Assistance (ODA) produces a positive effect on
economic growth and human development in less developed countries.21 This is possible
because ODA enters directly as government revenue which can be spent immediately on
human development projects such as education. The initial increase in human
development spending causes an increase in human capital, and a more educated
workforce or better transportation systems, which directly stimulates economic growth.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT contributes to ECONOMIC GROWTH by
increasing the capacity of the workforce, which in turn alters the organization and
adaptability of production and the range and complexity of economic output. This
contributes to increasing national income through, among other things, social
capital and the policy environment.22
ODA may go straight to government revenues but that does not ensure that
government spending will foster human development. To be successful the government
must put emphasis on human development policies because low priority will cause no
human development and in some cases aid may be used against human development.23
The aid can end up in the hand of the elites which can boost initial economic growth but

20

21
22
23

Adedeji. 107.
Kosack, S., & Tobin, J. (2006). Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, FDI and
Government in Economic Success.International Organization,60(1), 205-243.
Kosack, S., & Tobin, J. 205-243.
Ibid.

17

will not be sustained. Along with high priority for human development governments must
also have positive fiscal, monetary, and trade policies to properly utilize the aid.24
Burnside and Dollar also found that in the place of poor policies aid had no effect on
economic growth.
Along with economic growth there are other economic effects foreign aid has on
recipient nations. Almost all of the literature agrees that foreign aid increases
government spending but there are disagreements on whether it spurs economic growth.
While government spending increases with foreign aid, government revenues tend to
decrease because of lowering taxes or cutting other forms of government funding;
undercutting the actual development of the recipient country.25 The literature on how
foreign aid effects economic growth is quite extensive but there is serious debate as to
what effect aid has on democratization.
ODA and Democracy
There is much literature that concludes that foreign aid has a positive effect on
democratization.26 None of the studies, however, found that democratization happens in
all cases of foreign aid. Wright (2009) uses two variables to determine the effect aid has
on democratization, size of the dictator’s coalition (chance of being elected in democratic
election) and economic growth.27 If aid is to be withheld if a country chooses not to
24 Burnside, Craig, David Dollar. 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth." American Economic
25
26

27

Review 90: 847–68.
Remmer, Karen. 2004. "Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government." American
Journal of Political Science 48(1): 77–92.
Goldsmith, Arthur. 2001. "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa." International Organization 55: 123–
48.
Wright, J. (2009). How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.American
Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 552-571.
DeWaal, A. (1997). Democratizing the aid encounter in africa.International Affairs, 73(4), 623-639.
Wright, J. (2009). How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.American
Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 552-571.
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democratize the ruler has to make the decision of what to do. Dictators that have a high
chance of winning an election will choose to democratize because it will not change their
status while dictators with small coalitions will choose to give up aid to maintain power.28
Dictators choose aid because it is fungible and they can use it to pay off opponents, fund
electoral campaigns, or simply pocket the money.29
Other supporters of foreign aid argue that the current system is ineffective and
instead aid needs to be funneled as government revenues. In removing aid from the
direct control of the recipient the donor state is determining where it will be spent which
undermines the legitimacy of the recipient government.30 So aid needs to be
democratized by allowing the recipient governments to handle the dispersion of funds
which will increase accountability. Increasing the accountability of the recipient
governments pushes them to adopt democratic principles so as to continue receiving aid
and possibly receive more aid with more democratization.31 De Waal’s conclusion is very
important because it addresses the issue of whether the donor or the donor’s conditions
have any effect on the recipient ability to democratize.
While no opponents suggest that there are no positive effects of foreign aid, they do
argue that aid is associated with a decrease in institutional quality and democratization or
little to no effect, known as the perversity thesis. The perversity thesis holds that foreign
aid actually degrades the recipient’s institutions by eliminating their self sustainability
because of their reliance on foreign aid. The World Bank argued that the problem for
Africa is poor governance, no accountability, corruption, and poor quality institutions
28

Ibid.

29 Feyzioglu, Tarhan, Vinaya Swaroop, Min Zhu. 1998. "A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of
Foreign Aid." World Bank Economic Review 12(1): 29–58.

30 DeWaal, A. (1997). Democratizing the aid encounter in africa.International Affairs, 73(4), 623-639.
31 Ibid.
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which are the prime reason for why aid diminishes democratic ideals. They find that
higher aid is associated with “larger declines in the quality of governance” in two ways.32
The first is that aid can cause a weakening of institutions because of high transaction
costs and time consuming projects. Foreign aid is generally associated with human
development projects such as education or infrastructure and the institutions in the
recipient nations lack the ability to carry out the projects efficiently. The second is that
aid makes it difficult to overcome the collective action problems which hinder the
capability of the state. States receiving high amounts of foreign aid will begin to become
dependent on the aid and the citizens will become accustomed to services without a
personal cost making it especially difficult for the government to become self-reliant on
internal sources of revenue such as taxes. Brautigam (2000) also concludes that foreign
aid can increase the power of the president in democracies which will degrade the
democracy.33 Another negative effect on democratization is
[a] large amount of aid can reduce the incentives for democratic
accountability. When revenues do not depend on the taxes raised from citizens and
business, there is less incentive for accountability [and] at the same time corrupt
government officials will try to perpetuate their rent-seeking activities by reducing
the likelihood of losing power.34
Goldsmith (2001) found evidence contrary to the perversity thesis that showed a
minor net plus in the ability for recipient states to govern.35 As noted there are some who
find that foreign aid actual degrades the governance of a country but there is still much
more evidence that movement towards democracy results from aid.
32 Brautigam, Deborah, Stephen Knack. 2004. "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in SubSaharan Africa." Economic Development and Cultural Change 52: 255–85.

33 Brautigam, Deborah. 2000. Aid Dependence and Governance . Stockholm : Almqvist & Wiksell
34
35

International.
Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo, Marta Reynal-Querol. 2008. "The Curse of Aid." Journal of
Economic Growth 13(3): 169–94.
Goldsmith, Arthur. 2001. "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa." International Organization 55: 123–
48.
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Another factor contributing to the type and amount of aid provided deals with the
various donors. Not only is the size of aid important but also who is giving it matters
because donors may have different agendas and conditions. One condition found is that
multilateral donors have a preference for providing aid to less populous countries. Where
a divergence occurs is what indicator aid is based on, economic need or human
development. Regional development banks base aid on economic need while UN
agencies base it on economic need as well as human needs.36 While some have
concluded that corruption or low political freedoms will cause a donor to limit aid in
general that does not hold true. When taken all together there is no statistically
significant difference between aid given to corrupt and non-corrupt governments.37
Another major factor in donor aid is how it will affect companies working on aid funded
projects in the recipient nations. Recipient nations know that the company will put
pressure on the donor to sustain aid allowing the recipient to undermine the conditionality
tied to the aid.38 Multinational companies have strong influence on the donors, since
sometimes they are based in the donor country, but have a different motive. The
competing motives are a significant roadblock to establishing aid conditionality. Other
factors influencing aid are geopolitical reasons dealing with establishing military bases
and higher aid given to former colonial states.39
Defining best practices for development assistance suffers from the same problems
36 Neumayer, E. (2003). The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development
37
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Banks and United Nations Agencies. International Studies Quarterly, 47(1), 101-122.
Ibid.
Alesina, A., & Weder, B. (2002). Do Corrupt Governments receive less foreign aid?. The American
Economic Review, 92(4), 1126-1137.
Villanger, E. (2004). Company Influence on Foreign Aid Disbursement: Is Conditionality Credible
When Donors Have Mixed Motives?.Southern Economic Journal,71(2), 334-351.
Neumayer, E. (2003). The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development
Banks and United Nations Agencies. International Studies Quarterly, 47(1), 101-122.
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as the debate over the most important aspects for successful democratization. There are
countless issues affecting aid and those issues are made up of countless other issues.
Assistance comes in many forms, sizes, and channels and identifying those serves the
important purpose of understanding some of the current limitations and successes. The
first issue is the specialization of the assistance, which is tied to the scope, goals, and
donors. Aid agencies tend to work in contrast to typical government agencies, as they
“split their assistance between too many donors, too many countries, and too many
sectors for each donor.”40 The agencies and recipients experience considerable
disadvantages from a cluttered aid environment through high overhead costs for both
donors and recipients, duplication, excessive time on the part of government ministers,
and forfeit the ability to scale up successes. The United States constitutes a perfect
example of the specialization problem; there are two official agencies dedicated to
foreign assistance but also more than 50 other government units providing assistance
even though it is not their main purpose.41 All of these agencies have overlapping
responsibilities with varying objectives that may or may not compete against one another.
One of the biggest problems of foreign assistance is defining objectives and desired
outcomes. Most donors, whether nations or development NGOs, have the broad
objective of ending poverty or, in even foggier language achieving development. The
dilemma though is “poverty and underdevelopment typically comprise a cluster of
problems, and it is often not clear which particular problems of the intended beneficiaries

40
41

Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign
Aid. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,22(2), 38.
Brainard, Lael. 2007. "Organizing U.S. For- eign Assistance to Meet Twenty-First Century
Challenges." In Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American
Leadership, ed. Lael Brainard, chap. 2. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
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an aid agency should address.”42 Agencies attempt to accomplish their goals through a
variety of methods aimed at improving the conditions of the recipients but often these
methods fail to meet the demands of the recipients. Sub-Saharan African states suffer
from many public administration deficits and lack of public voice which significantly
limits the beneficiaries' feedback to the aid agencies.43 The absence of useful feedback
coupled with the underlying donor objectives, noted earlier, causes aid agencies to
declare broad goals of development instead of fixing on the demands of the recipient.
The lack of recipient feedback serves as the biggest contributor to many of the
current issues with foreign assistance. First giving up on the goal of development can
lead to aid specialization that focuses on the demands of the beneficiary's society. When
freed from the development goal, foreign aid can be provided for those tasks with high
demand: “to reduce malaria deaths, to provide more clean water, to build and maintain
roads, to provide scholarships to talented but poor students, and so on.”44 In working to
answer the demands of the recipients, the donors are still working towards overall
development but in gradual steps instead of trying to correct every issue all at the same
time. The broad development goal suffers so much because it ignores the connections
between the underlying issues of poverty and underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa
which reinforces the inability to provide feedback. Sub-Saharan Africa lacks most of the
beginning steps for development such as some education, a healthy population, and basic
infrastructure so an aid agency trying to implement democratic or market institutions is
going to fail. Development and democratization occurs in a bottom up order not from “a
42
43
44

Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign
Aid. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,22(2), 32.
Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). 32.
Easterly, W. (2007). Was Development Assistance a Mistake?.The American Economic Review,97(2),
331.
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strategic vision offered by a few experts”45 so focusing on the beneficiary's demands will
allow for the recipient nation to progress naturally and through the will of its own actors.
Currently aid agencies suffer from a lack of specialization causing them to stretch
their objectives and lose sight of the issues facing recipient states which are the most
important to achieving democracy. Developing the beneficiary's social infrastructure is
the most essential first step towards democracy since as the population's quality of life
rises so too does the will and need of the people. Assistance needs to be geared towards
increasing the opportunities of the recipient population and less about transforming the
recipient because forced change only causes more problems.
The debate over democratization and foreign assistance produces more questions
than answers as there is evidence supporting opposing arguments. The two have strong
connections, not just in foreign aid's ability to foster democracy, but also the perspective
on democracy, whether driven by economic or social forces, carries over into the decision
on the best methods of ODA. This paper hopes to add to the discussion by analyzing
foreign assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa to determine not only its overall relationship
with democracy but also discover any differences between social and economic
infrastructure aid on governance and society. The paper assumes the position that social
conditions are most necessary for democratization so foreign assistance for social
programs engenders democratic growth more so than economic infrastructure aid. The
following sections establish the framework of the analysis, statistical tests of the
relationships, and interpretation of the results.

45

Ibid.
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Hypotheses
Ha = The larger the sum of ODA per capita to Sub-Saharan African states the greater the
probability of the state being democratic.
H0a = ODA per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no effect on the probability of a
state being democratic.
Hb1 = The larger the sum of social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African
states the greater the probability of the state being democratic.
H0b1 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no effect on
the probability of a state being democratic.
Hb2 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan Africa has a greater positive
effect on a state being democratic than economic infrastructure aid per capita due to its
greater ability to improve the social standing of citizens.
H0b2 = There is no measured difference between social and economic infrastructure aid
per capita in the degree of the effect on democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Hc1 = An increase in social infrastructure aid per capita in a Sub-Saharan African state
produces a direct increase in percentage of voice and accountability in the state.
H0c1 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no
measurable relationship with the percentage of voice and accountability in the state.
Hc2 = Social infrastructure aid per capita has a larger positive effect on the percentage of
voice and accountability in Sub-Saharan African states than economic infrastructure aid
per capita.
H0c2 = There is no measured difference between social and economic infrastructure aid
per capita in the magnitude of the effect on the percentage of voice and accountability in
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Sub-Saharan African states.
Hd1 = An increase in social infrastructure aid per capita in a Sub-Saharan African state
produces a direct increase in percentage of political stability and the absence of violence
in the state.
H0d1 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no
measurable relationship with the percentage of political stability and the absence of
violence in the state.
Hd2 = Social infrastructure aid per capita has a larger positive effect on the percentage of
political stability and the absence of violence in Sub-Saharan African states than
economic infrastructure aid per capita.
H0d2 = There is no measured difference between social and economic infrastructure aid
per capita in the magnitude of the effect on the percentage of political stability and the
absence of violence in Sub-Saharan African states.

Operationalization and Conceptualization
Time Frame
Two different time frames are used for the analysis, 1970 to 2008 and 2002 to 2009.
The varying time frames allow for multiple analyses of the effects of ODA in SubSaharan Africa.
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this study is the state, more specifically 42 Sub-Saharan
African states.
Data
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Date for the analysis is provided by the Polity IV project and the World Bank's
African Development Indicators.4647
Dependent Variable: Polity and Governance Indicators
The binomial dependent variable for democracy in the recipient nations will be
determined from the Polity IV Project. The Polity IV Project is made up of a 21 point
scale with values ranging from -10 to +10 (democracy= +6 to +10, anocracy= -5 to +5,
autocracy= -6 to -10). The Polity IV score is found by subtracting the democracy (0-10)
score by the autocracy score (0-10). The scores are composed of multiple factors that
make up a state's polity. First is the presence of institutions and processes where citizens
can express effective preference for policies and leaders. Second is the existence of
institutionalized constraints on executive power. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties
to all citizens. The score is specifically determined by the combination of four measures:
competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), the openness and competitiveness
of executive recruitment (XRCOMP and XROPEN), and constraints on executive power
(XCONST). In order to simplify the model the Polity IV score was used to create a
binomial variable to indicate whether the regime was a democracy by coding all Polity IV
scores of +6 or greater as 1 to indicate the state was a democracy. It is possible to run an
OLS regression with the Polity IV score, an ordinal variable, but for this analysis simply
identifying the statistical significance and direction of the relationship between foreign
assistance and democracy is sufficient.
Democracy 02-09
Non-Democratic

Count
229

Percent
65.06

46 Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2010. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2010. Version p4v2010e [Computer File]. College Park, MD: Center for International
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
47 World Bank. World Bank Africa Database 2010 [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank [Producer and
Distributor], 2011.
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Democratic

123

34.94

The Polity IV score is useful for the initial analyses of overall foreign aid, the social
and economic aid aggregates, and the breakdown of social aid because it allows for a
simple method for representing the polity of a state and its change over time. There are
considerably more non-democratic states than democratic states from 2002 to 2009, on
page 62-64 you can find a table of each democratic country by year. It does have
limitations though, the binomial dependent variable prevents an OLS regression which
would provide a much deeper analysis. The biggest loss is the inability to quantify the
effect each independent variable has on democracy. While an interval or ratio
measurement would have been ideal, the Polity IV score serves as the only accessible
indicator for democracy during the extended time frame.
The OLS regressions will use governance indicators provided by the World Bank
for the dependent variable instead of the Polity IV score. The World Bank provides a
percentage for voice and accountability, political stability/absence of violence,
government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption starting in 1996. Voice
and accountability and political stability/absence of violence are used in separate analyses
to determine the effect various types of ODA have in Sub-Saharan Africa. Voice and
accountability measures “the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and a free media.”48 Political stability and the absence of violence is measured by the
World Bank according the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means.”49 The use of percentages provides the
48 World Bank. World Bank Africa Database 2010 [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank [Producer and
Distributor], 2011.
49 Ibid.
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ability to use a time-series cross-sectional OLS regression, which as noted earlier is the
ideal method. The rankings though do not provide the same measurement as the Polity
IV since they do not directly indicate whether a state is a democracy. The rankings do
serve as a proxy for democracy as these are both components of a stable democracy with
a higher ranking expressing a more democratic or free state.
Variable
Voice and Accountability

Mean
31.19

Variable
Political Stability/Nonviolence

Mean

Standard
Deviation
20.05
Standard
Deviation
32.99

Minimum
0.95

Maximum
77.4

Minimum

Maximum
89

22.36

0

The ability to directly represent the polity of a state is not the most important aspect
of the study to demonstrate the ability of various types of aid to foster democracy. The
measured effect on the chosen rankings measures the capability of aid in cultivating the
characteristics integral to fostering democracy. Voice and accountability measures the
public's ability to freely participate in their national government and the degree to which
the government represents the will of the people. Political stability and the absence of
violence is the other important dependent variable because it captures the broader picture
of the government and state. Maintaining political stability is key for any emerging
democracy but especially important in Sub-Saharan Africa where there exist substantial
societal divisions. A continued political stability ensures smooth government transitions,
limited corruption, and overall proper government functioning.
Independent Variable 1: ODA per Capita
The data for ODA per capita is provided from the World Bank database and is
measured in current U.S. dollars. ODA per capita is preferable to net ODA as it indicates
the amount of aid per person accounting for population differences.
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Independent Variable 2: Aggregate Indicators for Social Infrastructure and
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita
Variable
Social per Capita
Variable
Economic per Capita

Standard
Deviation

Mean
23.11
Mean
7.95

17.55
Standard
Deviation
28.95

Minimum
1.55

Maximum
143.78

Minimum
0

Maximum
507.49

The amount of aid provided for social infrastructure and services is generated by
taking the World Bank's measurement for gross ODA disbursement for social
infrastructure and services over the population. The indicator accounts for all aid
provided for education, health, population programs, water supply and sanitation, and
government and civil society from DAC donors in current U.S. dollars. The amount of
aid for economic infrastructure is generated the same way but is the aggregate of aid
provided for transport and storage, communications, energy, banking and financial
services, and business and other services. These aggregates capture the ability of aid
provided for different sectors to improve prospects for democracy. The aggregates were
chosen because they represent the continued debate between whether economic or social
characteristics more greatly cultivate democracy.
Independent Variable 3: Micro Indicators of Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita
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Along with meta indicator for social infrastructure aid, a set of micro indicators are
used to break down the components of the meta variable. The micro indicators are ODA
Table 1
Variable Name
Education

Description
This is the aggregate total for education level unspecified.
This is described as economic and development policy/planning;
public sector financial management; legal and judicial development;
general administration; strengthening civil society; elections; human
rights; free flow of information and women's equality organisations
Government and Civil Society
and institutions.
Health
This is the aggregate total for general health and basic health.
This is described as population policy and administrative
management; reproductive health care; family planning; STD control
Population Programs and Reproductive including HIV/AIDS and personnel development for population and
Health
reproductive health.
This is described as water resources policy and administrative
management; water resources protection; water supply and
sanitation - large systems; basic drinking water supply and basic
sanitation; river development; waste management/disposal and
Water Supply and Sanitation
education and training in water supply and sanitation.

distributed for various sectors within society (variables and descriptions can be found in
Table 1 below). The micro variables make up the aggregate Social Infrastructure Aid
variable and will be used to determine if there are differing relationships among sector
specific social aid and the dependent variables. The analysis of the micro variables
effects provides reasoning behind sector specialization of aid to those areas where it
causes the largest positive gains.
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Variable
Education Aid per Capita

Mean

Variable
Government Aid per Capita

Mean

Variable
Health Aid per Capita

Mean

Variable
Water/Sanitation Aid per
Capita

Mean

Variable
Population Assistance per
Capita

Mean

Standard
Deviation
5.86

5.95

Minimum
0.1

Maximum
44.24

7.87

Minimum
0.26

Maximum
131.27

Minimum

Maximum
19.1

Standard
Deviation
5.12
Standard
Deviation
3.74

2.88
Standard
Deviation

2.14

0

Minimum
2.36

Standard
Deviation
4.54

Maximum
0

Minimum
10.35

13.88

Maximum
0

120.9

Control: GDP per Capita
GDP per capita serves as a major economic control for the analysis. It will control
for whether or not it is a country's own economic capacity fueling governance. GDP per
capita is provided in current U.S. dollars from the World Bank.
Variable
GDP per Capita

Mean
1453.42

Standard
Deviation
2767.28

Minimum
85.54

Maximum
28102.53

Control: Urbanization X Population Density
The combination of urbanization and population density accounts for the proximity
citizens have to one another which, affects multiple factors in society such as
communication and ability to demonstrate. In the least developed countries, urbanization
is typically seen as a factor for democratization because urban populations have greater
access to information, political participation, and mobilization. Many of these states
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began as highly rural but over time urbanized and this change needs to be controlled for
in the analysis. Population density is combined because it adds the extra dimension of
overall closeness of the population. The two variables cannot be used independently
either because of multicollinearity issues.
Variable
Population Density X
Urbanization

Mean

Standard
Deviation

2750.4

Minimum

4212.93

Maximum

77.34

26725.33

Control: Employment to Population Ratio
The final control measures the percentage of the population employed. The data are
provided from the World Bank database and identifies the percentage of the population
18 and older employed within the state. Employment to population ratio controls for the
effect employment has on governance as the higher employment is the less prevalence of
instability and the greater the ability of citizens to participate in government.
Variable
Employment to Population

Standard
Deviation

Mean
65.79

11.55

Minimum
36.5

Maximum
84.8

Variable/Data Limitations
As discussed in the literature review there are many societal conditions that affect
governance both universally and specific to Sub-Saharan Africa. In analyzing the effect
of foreign assistance on democracy, these societal conditions need to be adequately
controlled for to ensure the most robust models. Some of the most important variables
are controlled for in the regression: GDP per capita, Urbanization and Population density,
and employment to population ratio; but there are also many unaccounted for societal
variations as well. The most apparent are: literacy rate, average amount of education, the
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health of the population, measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, accessibility to
running water and sewage systems, telephone access, access to information sources
(radio, newspapers, television), access to paved roads, access to electricity, and countless
other variables. While it would be ideal to include an indicator for all of these variables,
the reality is measures for these indicators do not exist or are severely limited for SubSaharan Africa. For example data on literacy rates are only available for some SubSaharan states and even then normally only for one year. The lack of quality societal
level data out of Sub-Saharan Africa is not surprising though as there is little structure in
place to quantify the measures. The forceful exclusion of known controls is cumbersome
but also piques the interest as the presence of so many unknowns ensures the analysis can
always evolve. The fixed effects of each model helps account for these unmeasured
effects by assuming there are unchanging effects within a state that may change between
states.
Methodology
In analyzing the effect of ODA on governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, three models
will be used to account for multiple factors. All models will use a time-series crosssectional multivariate fixed effects regression. Models 1, 2, and 5 will use a logistic
regression while models 3, 4, and 6 will use OLS regression. While differing in a few
ways, each model will most importantly be assessing ODA's effect on
governance/democracy while controlling for various state characteristics such as GDP per
capita and population density. The table below provides all of the necessary information
for each model.
Table 2: Model
Specifications

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5
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Type of Analysis
Panel
Time

Time-Series
CrossSectional
Logistic
Regression
FE
State
1970-2008

Time-Series
CrossSectional OLS
Regression FE
State
2002-2009

Time-Series
CrossSectional OLS
Regression FE
State
2002-2009

Time-Series
CrossSectional OLS
Regression FE
State
2002-2009

Time-Series
Cross-Sectional
OLS Regression
FE
State
2002-2009

Dependent Variable

Binomial
Democracy
Variable

Voice and
Accountability
Ranking

Political
Stability and
No Violence
Ranking

Voice and
Accountability
Ranking

Political
Stability and No
Violence
Ranking

ODA per
Capita

Aid for Social
Infrastructure
per Capita, Aid
for Economic
Infrastructure
per capita

Aid for Social
Infrastructure
per Capita,
Aid for
Economic
Infrastructure
per capita

Micro Level
Aid Indicators

Micro Level Aid
Indicators

GDP per
Capita,
Urbanization
X Population
Density

GDP per
Capita,
Urbanization X
Population
Density,
Employment to
Population
Ratio

GDP per
Capita,
Urbanization
X Population
Density,
Employment
to Population
Ratio

GDP per
Capita,
Urbanization
X Population
Density,
Employment
to Population
Ratio

GDP per Capita,
Urbanization X
Population
Density,
Employment to
Population Ratio

Main Independent Variables

Controls

The first model answers the introductory question of whether ODA even has an
effect on democracy. The reason for using the longer time frame is to increase the
number of observations as much as possible to improve the quality of the analysis. The
rest of the models will answer the deeper question of what types of aid are actually
contributing to improvements in Sub-Saharan Africa and possibly whether some forms of
aid degrading democracy. All tests for the quality of the data and regressions have been
conducted to ensure all regression assumptions are met.
Data Analysis
Model 1: Analysis of ODA per Capita on Democracy, 1970-2008
The first model serves as a preliminary analysis of official development assistance
on democracy from 1970 to 2008. A time-series cross-sectional logistic regression was
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used to assess whether ODA has had any effect on democracy over an extended time
period using the binomial democracy variable. The results show that ODA per capita
does have a statistically significant effect on democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa when all
other variables are held constant. GDP per capita is also statistically significant at the
99% level when all other variables are held constant while the combined variable
measuring Urbanization and Population Density is not statistically significant.

Table 3: Multivariate Logistic Regression on Democracy in Sub-Saharan States, 1970-2008
Independent
Coefficient
Variables
(Standard Error)
ODA per Capita
.024**
(.004)
GDP per Capita
.005**
(.001)
Urbananization X Population Density
-.000
(.000)
Observations
717
Groups
39
LR Chi-Squared
103.92**
Log-Likelihood
-271.37
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)

Both ODA per capita and GDP per capita have a statistically significant positive
effect on democracy in the analysis, which matches previous research. The logistic
regression does not provide a quantity for the measured effect the independent variables
have on democracy but the coefficients can be compared for degree of effect as each is
measured on the same scale of dollars per capita. In this regression ODA per capita has
almost 5 times the effect on democracy than GDP per capita (.024 to .005 respectively).
ODA's greater effect on democracy demonstrates how not only ODA does have a positive
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influence but also provides the strongest change on governance among the measured
variables. While the results align with previous research it is important to first show the
relationship because the rest of the analysis is worthless if the relationship does not exist.
Model 2: Analysis of Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid on Democracy,
2002-2009
Model 2 measures the effect Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid has on
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis uses the same binomial democracy
variable as model 1 so while the results indicate statistically significant relationships,
they do not provide as substantive an interpretation as the OLS regressions. As the table
below shows Social Infrastructure Aid has a positive, statistically significant relationship
with democracy in Sub-Saharan African states when all other variables are held constant.
Economic Infrastructure Aid does not have a statistically significant effect on democracy,
which supports the hypothesis that Social Aid has a positive effect on democracy in SubSaharan Africa and a greater effect than Economic Aid.
Both Urbanization/Population Density and Employment to Population Ratio are
statistically significant as well. Employment to Population does have a rather large effect
but is in the negative direction which indicates that the more employed the population is
the less likely a country is to be democratic in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results of the
first two models have so far supported the hypotheses and warrant additional analysis to
determine what facets of a democratic society the aid is effecting to cause the
relationship.
Table 4: Multivariate Logistic Regression on Democracy in Sub-Saharan States, 2002-2009
Independent
Coefficient
Variables
(Standard Error)
Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita
.439**
(.103)
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Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita

.213
(.140)
-.000
(.001)
.001*
(.000)
-.313**
(.083)
2.48
(5.88)
292
42
57.78**
-59.78

GDP per Capita
Urbananization X Population Density
Employment to Population
Constant
Observations
Groups
Chi-Squared
Log-Likelihood
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)

Model 3: Analysis of Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid on Voice and
Accountability, 2002-2009
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between economic aid and voice and accountability. The data points are not clustered in
a way that would indicate a significant relationship between the two especially with there
being clusters that fall outside of the main grouping.
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on the next page. The results support the hypothesis that there is a positive, statistically
significant relationship between Social Infrastructure Aid and Voice and Accountability in
Sub-Saharan Africa when all other variables are held constant. The model indicates for
every $1 per capita increase in Social Infrastructure Aid the Voice and Accountability
ranking increases by .1 percentage point when all other variables are held constant.
While an increase of .1 percentage points may seem insignificant, but a $10 per capita
increase in Social Infrastructure Aid would yield a 1 percentage point increase. Also the
interpretation needs to take into account the effect over time as a onetime $10 per capita
increase in aid would lead to a 10 percentage point increase over a decade. An increase
of 10 percentage points from just Social Infrastructure Aid is quite considerable and when
coupled with other variables increasing Voice and Accountability a Sub-Saharan state can
move closer to a free, democratic society rapidly over time.

Table 5: Multivariate OLS Regression on Voice and Accountability in Sub-Saharan States, 20022009
Independent
Coefficient
Variables
(Standard Error)
Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita
.103**
(.034)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita
.172
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GDP per Capita
Urbananization X Population Density
Employment to Population
Constant
Observations
Groups
Adj. R-squared
Root MSE
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)

(.1)
.000
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
-.426*
(.182)
57.47**
(11.7)
299
42
.97
3.14

The only other statistically significant variable is the Employment to Population
Ratio (-.426), the negative coefficient goes against the expected outcome though. The
other main independent variable, Economic Infrastructure Aid, is not statistically
significant which supports the second part of model that Social Infrastructure Aid has a
greater effect on Voice and Accountability than Economic Infrastructure Aid. A final
interesting observation is that GDP per capita is not significant in Model 2 but was in the
longer time frame Model 1.
Model 3 is also a strong predictor of the change in Voice and Accountability which
provides even more strength to the estimates. The model is explaining 97% of the
variance in Voice and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is very high but not
unexpected. The fixed effects model automatically accounts for invariant measures
within each country such as ethnicity.

Model 4: Analysis of Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid on Political Stability
and Non-Violence, 2002-2009
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As the results show none of the independent variables had statistically significant
effect on the percentage ranking for Political Stability and the Absence of Violence. Not
only did none of the variables have a statistically significant effect but the model as a
whole did not meet the 95% threshold. Social Infrastructure Aid is in the positive
direction which was hypothesized, also while it did not meet the 95% probability cut off
it did fall within the 90% confidence interval.
Table 6: Multivariate OLS Regression on Political Stability and Non-Violence in Sub-Saharan States,
2002-2009
Independent
Coefficient
Variables
(Standard Error)
Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita
.067
(.036)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita
-.042
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P

a

o li t ic a l S

p i t a

( $

)

t a b i l

GDP per Capita
Urbananization X Population Density
Employment to Population
Constant
Observations
Groups
Adj. R-squared
Root MSE
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)

(.111)
.000
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
.274
(.247)
14.45
(16.24)
299
42
.91
6.75

Model 4 clearly is not as strong as Model 3 but it does still offer some insights when
comparing the results of all previous models. One important take-away is Social
Infrastructure Aid does have a statistically significant positive effect on democracy in
Sub-Saharan African states as shown in Model 2. Also Economic Infrastructure Aid does
not have a statistically significant relationship to democracy and even if it did Social Aid
still has a greater effect. Model 3 demonstrated Social Infrastructure Aid has quite a
profound effect on the Voice and Accountability of Sub-Saharan African states while
Model 4 provides evidence that Social Infrastructure Aid has little to no effect on the
Political Stability and Absence of Violence in the same states. The next section will
break out the Social Infrastructure aggregate to determine if certain facets of social aid
are driving the positive relationship with democracy and Voice and Accountability.

Model 5: Analysis of Components of Social Infrastructure Aid on Democracy,
2002-2009
The first analysis on the facets of Social Infrastructure Aid focuses on the effect each
aid component has on the binomial democracy variable. The hope is to more fully
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understand the relationship between social aid and democracy by determining whether
different aspects have different effects. The results of the analysis, in the table on the
next page, indicate that only aid provided for population programs and reproductive
health has a statistically significant relationship with democracy in Sub-Saharan African
countries when all other variables are held constant. The results are fairly unexpected as
the assumption was that aid provided for education, government, or health would be
contributing the most to the positive relationship between social infrastructure aid and
democracy.
Employment to population ratio is the only other statistically significant variable and
again the relationship is negative with democracy (-.347) when all other variables are
held constant. The rest of the results closely mimic those from model 2 with the most
significant being the economic infrastructure aid still does not have a statistically
significant relationship with democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally the model as a
whole is robust with a statistical significance at the 99% confidence level.
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Table 7: Multivariate Logistic Regression on Democracy in Sub-Saharan States, 2002-2009
Independent
Coefficient
Variables
(Standard Error)
Education Aid
.179
(.237)
Government and Civil Society Aid
.461
(.305)
Health Aid
.419
(.318)
Water and Sanitation Aid
.144
(.739)
Population Programs Aid
.786**
(.298)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita
.217
(.164)
GDP per Capita
-.000
(.001)
Urbananization X Population Density
.001*
(.000)
Employment to Population
-.347**
(.103)
Constant
7.29
(6.59)
Observations
290
Groups
42
Chi-Squared
39.87**
Log-Likelihood
-58.53
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)

Model 6: Analysis of Components of Social Infrastructure Aid on Voice and
Accountability, 2002-2009
The final model provides another level of understanding of Social Infrastructure Aid
by analyzing the sector specific aid effects on voice and accountability. The hope is to
determine at an even more granular level how different types of Aid affect voice and
accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Model 6 tests the relationship between voice and
accountability and aid provided for education, government and civil society, health,
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population programs, and water/sanitation. The aggregate Economic Infrastructure Aid
will continue to be measured for its effect on voice and accountability. The analysis
resembles model 3 except Social Infrastructure Aid is substituted for its five parts and
again is weighted by population size to correct for heteroskedesticity.
The results shown in the table on the next page provide some very interesting and
unexpected relationships. The most striking is the statistically significant, negative
relationship between education aid and voice and accountability (-.646) when all other
variables are held constant. The coefficient indicates that for every $1 per capita increase
in aid for education the voice and accountability ranking drops by .646 percentage points
so taken over 10 years the $1 per capita increase would drop the voice and accountability
in a Sub-Saharan African state by 6.5 percentage points. It was expected education aid
would have the greatest positive effect on voice and accountability among all of the
aspects of social aid so this result is quite striking, deserving future research.
Aid for government and civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa is also statistically
significant but in the positive direction, indicating a positive relationship between the aid
and voice and accountability when all other variables are held constant. Substantively a
$1 per capita increase in aid provided for government and civil society yields an .161
percentage point increase the voice and accountability ranking when all other variables
are held constant. Aid provided for the health sector has the greatest statistically
significant effect on voice and accountability out of all aspects of social aid. When aid
provided for the health sector increases by $1 per capita, voice and accountability rises by
.829 percentage points when all other variables are held constant. So again expanding
that increase to either $10 per capita or $1 per capita over 10 years would yield an 8.3
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percentage point increase in the voice and accountability of a Sub-Saharan African state
when all other variables are held constant.
Table 8: Multivariate OLS Regression on Voice and Accountability in Sub-Saharan States, 20022009
Independent
Coefficient
Variables
(Standard Error)
Education Aid
-.646**
(.198)
Government and Civil Society Aid
.161**
(.058)
Health Aid
.829**
(.203)
Water and Sanitation Aid
.326
(.302)
Population Programs Aid
-.003
(.074)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita
.157
(.098)
GDP per Capita
.000
(.000)
Urbananization X Population Density
-.000
(.000)
Employment to Population
-.238
(.181)
Constant
47.21**
(11.85)
Observations
290
Groups
42
Adj. R-squared
.96**
Root MSE
3.07
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)

The model as a whole is statistically significant from zero and very robust. The
adjusted R-square indicates the model explains 96% of the variance in voice and
accountability. Clearly aid provided for the health sector is having a dramatic positive
impact on the voice and accountability of Sub-Saharan African states with government
and civil society having a more minimal positive effect. The negative relationship
between education aid and voice and accountability is disconcerting though since
improving the education of a state was thought to be a good method for promoting
46

democratic ideals.

Interpretation of Results
The results of the analysis on foreign assistance and democracy in Sub-Saharan
Africa lead to some interesting conclusions. The results of the first model came as little
surprise, as it was expected, based on countless previous studies, the hypothesis that
larger amounts of ODA per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa positively correlates to
democratic governance. As shown in previous literature, ODA has consistently stood up
to statistical tests on its ability to affect government systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and
globally. While the model just upheld previously supported theories, it was still essential
for providing the beginning framework for the argument. Also the results did produce
one interesting insight, both ODA per capita and GDP per capita have a statistically
significant positive relationship with democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa meaning each
works together to increase democracy. The difference in magnitudes indicates that SubSaharan African states do not currently possess national economic conditions to
independently improve their status. Sub-Saharan African states rely on ODA to
compensate for the limited government revenues from within the state and without these
monetary infusions the government would most likely be incapable of providing services.
If anything else this model further demonstrates the inability of most Sub-Saharan
African states to operate autonomously from foreign assistance to the point that ending
assistance would incur a complete collapse of the state.
Where model 1 provides little new insights, model 2 is a whole different story. The
relationship between democracy and different forms of aid has received considerably less
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attention, mostly due to the lack of data until recently. The regression results supported
the hypotheses that social infrastructure aid has a positive relationship with democracy as
well as that social infrastructure aid has a greater effect on democracy then economic
infrastructure aid. The results could not have better reinforced the proposition that
assistance for social programs is the best method for cultivating democracy in SubSaharan African states. The fact social infrastructure aid has the greatest positive effect
on democracy should not be surprising since this paper accepts the notion that social
conditions play the biggest role in democratization. The complete absence of a
relationship between economic infrastructure aid and democracy is somewhat surprising
though as it was expected to have some effect just less than social infrastructure aid.
Not only does social infrastructure aid have a statistically significant positive effect
on democracy but also on the voice and accountability percentage ranking. This positive
relationship with voice and accountability provides a possible explanation for social
infrastructure aid's ability to increase democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Voice and
accountability is an important characteristic of democracies as well as being necessary for
the public to demand government and societal reforms. Through increasing voice and
accountability, social infrastructure aid builds an integral component in Sub-Saharan
African societies for improving their personal rights and freedoms. Improving voice and
accountability appears to be social infrastructure aid's main contribution to democracy in
Sub-Saharan Africa as it has no effect on political stability and the absence of violence.
The lack of a relationship with political stability and the absence of violence demonstrate
that while social infrastructure aid can improve citizens' capacity to express interests to
the government, it cannot improve alter the societal and political divisions hindering
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stability and fostering violence.
Social infrastructure aid's ability to improve the voice and accountability and in turn
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to certain sector aid specialization.
The analysis of the different social sector aids on the binomial democracy variable does
not provide much insight and taken by itself it appears none of the social sector specific
aids leads the influence. Instead it is the combination of all sectors causing the
relationship. The deeper analysis of social infrastructure aid's segments on voice and
accountability yields much richer and surprising conclusions into the ability to affect
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The most surprising result is the negative influence
of education sector assistance on voice and accountability, which goes against the
expected positive relationship. As noted earlier education is considered vital to crafting
democratic governance in states so education assistance's adverse effect on voice and
accountability must be attributed to some other aspects in Sub-Saharan African society.
While social infrastructure aid's positive relationship is not tied to education
assistance, the investigation into the other social sector aids does provide explanations
into the relationship through conclusions about Sub-Saharan African society. The most
striking results are the high magnitude positive relationship between health program
assistance and voice and accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa which more than
compensates for the negative effects from education assistance. Initially the result was
surprising until it was applied to the larger context of Sub-Saharan African society and
democratization. As mentioned in the literature review a healthy population is highly
important for a developing state because basic health needs must be overcome before a
population can progress to more metaphysical needs. Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from
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the worst health issues in the world such as multiple deadly epidemics and limited if not
nonexistent access to basic healthcare and medication. In a society afflicted by such
severe health concerns it comes as no surprise health assistance currently contributes
most to Sub-Saharan development as it addresses the most pressing demands.
The whole purpose of foreign assistance is to drive recipient's development by
targeting the most urgent and lowest stage development impediments and then move onto
the higher stages. Right now foreign assistance has gotten ahead of itself by focusing on
multiple development stages, most important here is education, while the recipient's
society is still stuck at the beginning stages. Health sector assistance provides the biggest
boost to voice and accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa since it addresses the current
level of development in the recipients. Foreign aid for health programs serves to rid the
population of constant struggles for survival thus allowing citizens to start demanding
greater rights and freedoms such as education and a political voice. The only other
positive aspect of social infrastructure assistance, government and civil society, on voice
and accountability is to be expected since an increase in funding for the administration
should lead to an increase in government capabilities.
The ability of social infrastructure aid to target the public's pressing needs explains
both its positive relationship with democracy and voice and accountability as well as the
inability of economic infrastructure aid. Development assistance succeeds by creating
opportunities for the recipient, and in Sub-Saharan Africa's current funding the trade and
banking sector does little to provide opportunities for such an underdeveloped population.
It would be wrong to say economic infrastructure aid does nothing to foster development
but most of Sub-Saharan Africa is not at the stage where the general population benefits.
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As Sub-Saharan African states progress, economic sector assistance will begin to become
more important as larger proportions of the population are directly affected by
commercial markets.
Recommendations
The conclusions from the data analysis offer compelling recommendations on how
foreign assistance should be administered to Sub-Saharan Africa addressing aid
specialization and recipient feedback. Current ODA distribution to Sub-Saharan Africa
provides sweeping assistance that seeks to alter all aspects of development which is the
wrong method. Part of the conversation on foreign aid should focus on the need for
sector and program specialization so that aid pinpoints the important needs and prevents
donors from stretching themselves. The data results support foreign aid specialization
specifically for social infrastructure and only certain social sectors. Foreign donors need
to focus their resources on improving the health of the population through direct
intervention and increasing the recipient's health care capabilities. Concentration on
health assistance allows ODA works to meet the current level of development in SubSaharan Africa ensuring a larger amount of funding for the sectors with the greatest
benefits.
Foreign assistance needs to be specialized to address the most pressing recipient
needs which can only be known through effective recipient feedback. The recipient
population knows the most important considerations in their state and without this
knowledge donors just throw money at what they perceive to be most pressing. Not only
does feedback provide guidance as to the initial assistance but also can notify donors of
effective programs that deserve increased funding and those ineffective programs that
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should be terminated. Finally recipient feedback is vital to the evolution of the assistance
as the state develops. ODA should currently address health concerns in Sub-Saharan
Africa but once this stage has been achieved the feedback guides the direction into the
next development stages.
Further Research
The results of the analysis provided some key interpretations and recommendations
for foreign assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa but also raise some questions that need to be
addressed. First current data from Sub-Saharan Africa is very limited and in the future as
data becomes available important variables can be added to the equation to increase the
robustness of the results. Ideally literacy rates, education levels, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, and a host of other socioeconomic indicators would be included in the
analysis which would ensure all societal aspects are controlled. Along with adding
controls, future research should expand the number of assistance programs analyzed to
determine if there are any other forms of assistance contributing to democracy in SubSaharan Africa. Increasing the number of independent variables and controls permits
further research to explore foreign assistance at a more granular level.
The final area of further research is to analyze the relationship between foreign
assistance programs and their specific sectors, which is only accessible through additional
data. Even though it was shown health assistance increased the voice and accountability
in Sub-Saharan Africa it is not known what effect the assistance actually had on the
health of the population. Also there is the possibility the results show no relationship
between health assistance and the health of the population which raises even more
questions as to what is causing the aid to increase democracy. A final part of the analysis
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involves analyzing the relationship between the different sectors and democracy to
determine which sectors contribute most to development. The combination of the
analysis of assistance on each sector and each sector on democracy would provide the
most exhaustive conclusions about the foreign assistance and democracy.

Concluding Remarks
Foreign assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa offers one of the most intriguing studies in
international relations. The region is one of the most volatile in the world, with ever
changing political institutions, constant civil strife, and rampant poverty. The region lags
behind all other developing regions even though continuous attempts are made to
democratize and instill progressive reforms. Western nations and development agencies
have since the end of colonialism sought to provide the region with economic assistance
with the intent to spur social and economic development with the end goal of a
democratic region. The hope is that as the region's states become more democratic, they
will provide additional opportunities for the international, regional, and national markets
as well as increased stability.
Studies have long desired to determine the effects of foreign assistance in SubSaharan Africa in order to understand its effectiveness. Understanding the relationship
between ODA and democracy and development is important to identify the areas of
positive democratic and development growth due to aid and where it may actually
diminish opportunities. Over time the research has progressed from basic analyses of
ODA and economic growth to ODA and democracy and now needs to become more
granular into the various forms of ODA and different societal and economic
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characteristics. Researchers have been able to begin approaching the more detailed
analyses as data from Sub-Saharan Africa becomes more available and reliable and as the
availability of the data grows so too does the research.
This paper's focus is limited in order to capture specific aspects of foreign assistance
and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to further understand methods of
assistance. The results provide insights into where foreign assistance currently succeeds
and fails, giving guidance for the specialization of future ODA. The paper makes the
argument for assistance geared towards social aspects of society as the best method for
promoting democracy and development. The results of the analysis back up the
argument, making the case for drastic changes in foreign assistance allocation in order to
maximize the benefits while limiting the costs. Not only do donors need to target specific
social challenges but also scale back overall assistance as to not stretch themselves to the
point where they cannot properly assess their actions. The analysis captures just one
snapshot of foreign assistance and still fairly high level and only though additional
measures of socioeconomic characteristics will the research be capable of truly
understanding the granular relationships between ODA, democracy, and society.
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Appendix
Model 3: Assumption Tests
Heteroskedesticity
Residuals by Population Size
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Table : Model 3 Multicollinearity
Independent Variable
Social Infrastructure Aid
Employment to Population
Economic Infrastructure Aid
Urbananization X Population Density
GDP per Capita

VIF

1/VIF
3.68
3.06
2.31
1.44
1.41

0.27
0.33
0.43
0.69
0.71

Model 4 Assumption Tests
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Table : Model 4 Multicollinearity
Independent Variable
Social Infrastructure Aid
Employment to Population
Economic Infrastructure Aid
Urbananization X Population Density
GDP per Capita

VIF

1/VIF
3.68
3.09
2.32
1.44
1.41

0.27
0.32
0.43
0.69
0.71
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Model 6 Assumption Tests
Heteroskedesticity
Residuals by Population Size
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Multicollinearity
Ta ble : Mode l 6 Multicollinea rity
Independe nt Varia ble
Health Aid
Education Aid
Employment to Population Ratio
Economic Infrastructure Aid
W ater and Sanitation Aid
Population Aid
Government Aid
Population Density X Urbanization
GDP per Capita

VIF

1/VIF
4.5
4.8
4.7
4.6
4.4
1.96
1.85
1.77
1.53

0.14
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.51
0.54
0.57
0.66

Democratic Sub-Saharan Countries, 2002-2009
Country
Year
Benin
2002
Benin
2003
Benin
2004
Benin
2005
Benin
2006
Benin
2007
Benin
2008
Benin
2009
Botswana
2002
Botswana
2003
Botswana
2004
Botswana
2005
Botswana
2006
Botswana
2007
Botswana
2008
Botswana
2009
Burundi
2005
Burundi
2006
Burundi
2007
Burundi
2008
Burundi
2009
Comoros
2004
Comoros
2005
Comoros
2006
Comoros
2007
Comoros
2008
Comoros
2009
Ghana
2002
Ghana
2003
Ghana
2004
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Ghana
Ghana
Ghana
Ghana
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Lesotho
Lesotho
Lesotho
Lesotho
Lesotho
Lesotho
Lesotho
Lesotho
Liberia
Liberia
Liberia
Liberia
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
Malawi
Malawi
Malawi
Malawi
Malawi
Malawi
Mali
Mali
Mali
Mali
Mali
Mali
Mali

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2006
2007
2008
2009
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

64

Mali
Mauritius
Mauritius
Mauritius
Mauritius
Mauritius
Mauritius
Mauritius
Mauritius
Namibia
Namibia
Namibia
Namibia
Namibia
Namibia
Namibia
Namibia
Niger
Niger
Niger
Niger
Niger
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South Africa
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Zambia
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